

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-12

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L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02
SS-15 ICA-11 TRSE-00 NSC-05 BIB-01 EB-08 COME-00
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P R 151613Z JUN 78

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2954

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION USNATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0343

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM NATO

SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: JUNE 15 EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

AT THE 173RD PLENARY MEETING OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS,

WHICH WAS HELD ON JUNE 15 UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF
LUXEMBOURG REP (WINTER), CZECHOSLOVAK REP (KEBLUSEK)
DELIVERED THE ONLY STATEMENT. IN HIS PRESENTATION, WHICH DEALT
MAINLY WITH FAMILIAR EASTERN CRITICISMS
OF THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE CEILINGS AND THAT ASPECT
OF THE JUNE 8 EASTERN PROPOSALS RELATED TO THIS QUESTION,
KEBLUSEK ALSO DISMISSED THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE APRIL 19
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WESTERN INITIATIVE COULD LEAD TO PROGRESS ON FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES
IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND STRONGLY ASSERTED THE EXISTENCE OF
APPROXIMATE MILITARY MANPOWER EQUALITY BETWEEN NATO AND WARSAW
PACK FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE FULL TEXT OF THE INFORMAL
DELEGATION TRANSLATION OF CZECHOSLOVAK REP'S STATEMENT, WHICH
WAS DELIVERED IN RUSSIAN, FOLLOWS BELOW. BEGIN TEXT:

1. THE STRUGGLE FOR THE LIMITATION OF THE ARMS RACE AND FOR DISARMAMENT HAS TAKEN, IN RECENT TIMES, A NEW MORE CONSISTENT CHARACTER. JUDGING BY THE COURSE OF THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNO ON DISARMAMENT IN NEW YORK, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS CLEARLY DECIDED TO BRING PRACTICAL RESULTS IN THIS COMPLICATED FIELD. IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE SHOULD ALSO BRING ITS OWN REAL CONTRIBUTION IN THE MATTER OF DISARMAMENT.

2. THE COURSE OF THE VIENNA TALKS UP TO NOW RAISES RATHER ANXIETY THAN GRATIFICATION. AS THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC B. CHNOUPEK DECLARED AT THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE UNGA ON MAY 26 OF THIS YEAR "WE CANNOT BE GRATIFIED AT THE FACT THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, IN WHICH MY COUNTRY IS ALSO TAKING PART, ARE IN THEIR 5TH YEAR ALREADY WITHOUT THE ACHIEVEMENT OF ANY TANGIBLE RESULTS. IN OUR OPINION, THE VIENNA TALKS, WHICH REPRESENT THE FIRST EXAMPLE OF THIS SORT IN HISTORY, MUST FREE THEMSELVES FROM ENDLESS DISCUSSION OF TECHNICAL DETAILS ALONE, MUST FREE THEMSELVES FROM ALL SORTS OF "ASYMMETRICAL" MODELS, WHICH ARE IN CONTRADICTION TO THE AGREED PRINCIPLES, AND GO TOWARD THE CHIEF THING; TO THE WORKING OUT OF A CONCRETE AGREEMENT. WE ON OUR SIDE, ARE PREPARED TO DO EVERYTHING TO REACH SUCH A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT".

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P R 151613Z JUN 78
FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2955
SECDEF WASHDC
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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FROM US REP MBFR

3. DURING THE ENTIRE COURSE OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS, THE SOCIALIST STATES DIRECT PARTICIPANTS HAVE BEEN STRIVING IN ORDER THAT THE FUTURE REDUCTIONS SHOULD STRICTLY CORRESPOND TO THE AGREED PRINCIPLES OF 1973. ANY AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE MUST FIRST OF ALL BE GENUINLY MUTUAL, EQUIVALENT, AND JUST. IT MUST FORESEE A REAL REDUCTION OF THE ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF EACH OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WITHOUT EXCEPTION, WHILE PRESERVING THE PRESENT FORCE RELATIONSHIP IN THE AREA OF REDUCTION, WHICH, FOR A LONG TIME ALREADY, HAS BEEN CHARACTERISED BY THE APPROXIMATE EQUALITY OF THE TWO MILITARY POLITICAL GROUPINGS. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT AN AGREEMENT MUST IN NO WAY GIVE TO ANY ONE STATE, OR GROUPING AS A WHOLE, ONE-SIDED MILITARY ADVANTAGES AT THE EXPENSE OF ANY OTHER STATE OR GROUPING. ONLY IN SUCH A WAY IS IT POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE FOR THE OBSERVATION OF THE PRINCIPLE
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OF NOT DIMINISHING THE SECURITY OF EITHER OF THE SIDES. THE SOCIALIST DIRECT PARTICIPANT COUNTRIES HAVE TAKEN ALL THIS INTO CONSIDERATION IN WORKING OUT THEIR SEVERAL PROPOSALS AND INITIATIVES, TABLED IN THIS ROOM, AND TO WHICH THEIR NEW COMPROMISE PROPOSALS OF 8 JUNE OF THIS YEAR ALSO BEAR WITNESS. WE NATURALLY EXPECT ALSO FROM OUR WESTERN PARTNERS A SIMILAR REALISTIC AND CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH TO THE SOLUTION OF THE BASIC, KEY QUESTIONS OF THE PROBLEM OF LOWERING THE EXCESSIVE CONCENTRATION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

4. HOWEVER, FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS THE WESTERN STATES HAVE EMBARKED ON THE COURSE OF DISPUTING SUCH A CONCEPTION OF THE REDUCTIONS IN A WAY WHICH WOULD GIVE THEM SIGNIFICANT ONE-SIDED MILITARY ADVANTAGES AT THE EXPENSE OF THE SECURITY OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. THE WEST IS ATTEMPTING, USING OUR NEGOTIATIONS, TO TURN TO ITS ADVANTAGE THE APPROXIMATE EQUALITY IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF THE WESTERN STATES AND THE COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW TREATY IN CENTRAL EUROPE, WHICH ALREADY EXIST FOR MANY YEARS, THROUGH THE CONCEPT OF "ASYMMETRICAL" REDUCTION. THE WESTERN APPROACH TO THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF THE REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IS PATENTLY, ENTIRELY IN CONTRADICTION WITH THE AGREED PRINCIPLES AND THE VERY IDEA OF A REDUCTION. UNFORTUNATELY, WE MUST OBSERVE THIS AFTER A PARTICULARLY PAINSTAKING ANALYSIS AND STUDY OF THE "CHANGES TO THE EXISTING PROPOSALS OF THE WEST" PRESENTED ON 19 APRIL OF THIS YEAR. IN PREVIOUS PLENARY SESSIONS, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE ALREADY SHOWN WHERE THE PRINCIPAL INSUFFICIENCIES OF THESE CHANGES ARE TO BE FOUND AND WHY THEY CANNOT LEAD TO

PROGRESS IN THE SOLUTION OF THE KEY QUESTIONS OF THE PROBLEM
OF THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL
EUROPE FROM ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

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5. TODAY, I SHOULD LIKE BRIEFLY TO DWELL ONLY ON THAT PART OF THE
WESTERN PROPOSALS OF 19 APRIL, WHICH CONCERNS THE WESTERN CONCEPTION
OF COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILINGS AND THE COLLECTIVE CHARACTER OF
OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED. AS WE HAVE REPEATEDLY SHOWN, THE WESTERN
UNDERSTANDING OF COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILINGS HAS BEEN, SINCE THE
VERY BEGINNING OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS, ONE OF THE CHIEF
OBSTACLES ON THE ROAD TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE FIRST PRACTICAL
RESULTS IN OUR WORK. AS I ALREADY EMPHASISED AT THE PLENARY
SESSION OF 31 MARCH OF THIS YEAR, THE WESTERN CONCEPTION OF
COLLECTIVE CEILINGS CONTRADICTS THE VERY IDEA OF THE MUTUAL
REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. THE WESTERN STATES
AS PREVIOUSLY, AND ALSO AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF THEIR CHANGES
OF 19 APRIL OF THIS YEAR, INSIST THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT BE
REACHED WHICH WOULD GIVE CERTAIN WESTERN EUROPEAN DIRECTLY
PARTICIPATING STATES THE POSSIBILITY TO ESCAPE A REDUCTION
ALTOGETHER, OR TO INCREASE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR ARMED
FORCES EVEN IN COMPARISON WITH THE PRESENT SITUATION. AS FOLLOWS
FROM THE WESTERN PROPOSALS AND THE EXPLANATIONS OF WESTERN
REPRESENTATIVES, THE CONCRETE CONTRIBUTION OF INDIVIDUAL WESTERN
EUROPEAN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AND CANADA IN REDUCTIONS, MUST NOT
BE THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION AT THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE
SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND THE NATO STATES.

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SS-15 ICA-11 TRSE-00 NSC-05 BIB-01 EB-08 COME-00
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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2956

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INFO USMISSION USNATO
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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FROM US REP MBFR

WE HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED SUCH A CLARIFICATION AFTER THE INTRODUCTION OF THE WESTERN CHANGES OF 19 APRIL. THESE "CHANGES" DO NOT IN FACT INTRODUCE ANY CHANGES WHATSOEVER INTO THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILINGS WHICH CONTAINS A WHOLE SERIES OF ESSENTIAL SHORTCOMINGS AND WITH WHICH IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES TO AGREE. SUCH AN APPROACH BY THE WESTERN COUNTRIES IS IN CONTRADICTION WITH THE VERY CHARACTER OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS WHICH ARE MULTILATERAL AND IN WHICH SOVEREIGN STATES ARE TAKING INDIVIDUAL PART AND NOT THE REPRESENTATIVES OF MILITARY GROUPINGS. AND NATURALLY IT IS EXPECTED BY THEM THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVEREIGNTY OF EACH STATE, THEY WILL TAKE UPON THEMSELVES INDIVIDUAL OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING THE REDUCTIONS. THEREFORE FOR US THE STATEMENTS AND EXPLANATIONS OF THE TYPE WHICH HAVE BEEN PUT FORWARD ARE UNJUSTIFIED AND CONSEQUENTLY UNACCEPTABLE. CONFIDENTIAL

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6. AT THE SAME TIME, OUR OUR OWN NEW PROPOSALS OF 8 JUNE THIS YEAR, THE SOCIALIST STATES DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, PURSUING THE AIM OF MOVING THE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD, TO A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE, TOOK INTO ACCOUNT THE DESIRES OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES ON THE QUESTION OF COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILINGS ALSO. IN OUR NEW PROPOSALS IT IS ENVISAGED THAT AFTER THE REDUCTION THE WESTERN STATES AND THE COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW PACT WILL HAVE IN THE REGION OF REDUCTION AN EQUAL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR ARMED FORCES - 900,000 MEN INCLUDING 700,000 GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL ON EACH SIDE. IT IS FURTHER STATED THAT COLLECTIVE LEVELS WILL BE ESTABLISHED ON THE LEVEL OF THE OVERALL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW PACT AND THE NATO STATES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WITHIN THE ABOVE INDICATED LIMITS. HOWEVER, IN ORDER TO GUARANTEE THE OBSERVANCE OF THE AGREED PRINCIPLES, ABOVE ALL THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL SIDES, AND TO GIVE THE REDUCTIONS A GENUINELY MUTUAL CHARACTER, THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE ENVISAGED AN INTERNAL MECHANISM FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE COLLECTIVE LEVELS OF THE OVERALL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES OF THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES AND THE NATO STATES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WITHIN THE AGREED LIMITS WHICH WOULD

ACCORD WITH ALL THESE JUSTIFIED DEMANDS. BY MEANS OF AN ORGANIC AND FLEXIBLE COMBINATION OF COLLECTIVE LEVELS OF FORCES WITH AN OUTCOME TO THE REDUCTION WHICH WOULD HAVE AN INDIVIDUAL CHARACTER WITH COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN ON THE PART OF ALL ELEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS AS REGARDS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ACTUAL REDUCTION, WE ARE PROPOSING A WAY OF WORKING OUT A FIRST CONCRETE AGREEMENT UNDER EQUITABLE AND MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS CONDITIONS. THE PROVISION IN OUR NEW PROPOSALS THAT THE VOLUME OF THE REDUCTION WILL BE ESTABLISHED FOR EACH STATE DIRECT PARTICIPANT SEPARATELY AND WILL BE DEFINED FOR EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT IN SUCH A WAY THAT IT IS APPROXIMATELY PROPORTIONAL TO THE OVERALL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF ITS ARMED FORCES ALSO
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ACCORDS WITH THIS.

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MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FROM US REP MBFR

7. CONSEQUENTLY, EACH STATE WOULD HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY OF

MAKING ITS OWN CONTRIBUTION, WHICH WOULD BE INDIVIDUAL AND EQUIVALENT TO THAT OF THE OTHERS, TO THE REDUCTION. "COLLECTIVITY" OF LEVELS IN THE PROPOSALS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IS UNDERSTOOD AS A MECHANISM BY WHICH THE COLLECTIVE LEVELS REACHED, AS A RESULT OF REDUCTIONS, WILL BE MAINTAINED AND REGULATED. HOWEVER THE PATH TOWARDS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THESE LEVELS MUST BE PAVED WITH INDIVIDUAL COMMITMENTS BY ALL STATES DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WITHOUT EXCEPTION. THE COMBINATION, IN THIS WAY, OF INDIVIDUAL COMMITMENTS WITH COLLECTIVE LEVELS IS JUST AND IS OF A GENUINELY COMPROMISE CHARACTER FOR ITS MOVES TOWARDS THE WESTERN POSITION REGARDING COLLECTIVE CEILINGS AND AT THE SAME TIME GUARANTEES A GENUINELY MUTUAL AND EQUIVALENT CONTRIBUTION BY EACH PARTICIPANT IN THE AGREEMENT TO THE REDUCTION OF ITS OWN FORCES AND ARMAMENTS.
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8. PRECISELY THIS SORT OF INDIVIDUAL AND EQUIVALENT CONTRIBUTION BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, NAMELY GUARANTEES THAT THE REDUCTIONS WHICH WILL BE EFFECTED BY THEM WILL BE CARRIED OUT IN DEFINITE VOLUMES AND WITHIN AGREED TIME PERIODS FOR EACH OF THEM, GIVES THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES THE POSSIBILITY OF ACCEPTING THAT TWICE AS MANY SOVIET FORCES AS AMERICAN SHOULD BE REDUCED IN THE FIRST STAGE JUST AS THE WEST INSISTS. ONLY IN THIS CASE, COULD THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH WOULD BE REDUCING SIGNIFICANTLY MORE OF ITS FORCES THAN THE USA IN THE FIRST STAGE, BE ABLE TO KNOW BY HOW MANY OF THEIR FORCES AND WHEN ALL THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATION WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES IN THE SECOND STAGE.

9. THE NEW PROPOSALS BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ALSO ENVISAGE THAT THE COLLECTIVE LEVELS WILL COVER THE FORCES OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS INCLUDING THE USSR AND THE USA. THIS CONDITION STRICTLY OBSERVES THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL THE SIDES AND PLACES ALL THE STATES PARTICIPATING IN THE AGREEMENT IN AN IDENTICAL SITUATION. THE ADVANTAGES OF OUR PROPOSAL CONSIST IN THE FACT THAT IT IS AN EFFECTIVE WAY OF EMBODYING THE PRINCIPLE OF GENUINE MUTUALITY OF THE COMMITMENTS WHICH ARE UNDERTAKEN.

10. WE ARE ALL PROBABLY IN AGREEMENT THAT THE FUTURE AGREEMENT MUST ENVISAGE A REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS BY ALL THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS. JUDGING FROM THE STATEMENTS BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PARTICIPATING DELEGATIONS, SUCH AN UNDERSTANDING HAS EXISTED SINCE THE TIME OF THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS AND FOUND ITS CONCRETE REFLECTION IN THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF 28 JUNE 1973. IN TWO WEEKS TIME IT WILL BE JUST FIVE YEARS FROM THE DAY OF ITS SIGNATURE. IT SEEMS TO US THAT THE BEST WAY OF MARKING THIS JUBILEE DATE IS A CONSISTENT
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AND STRICT OBSERVANCE OF BOTH THE SPIRIT AND THE LETTER OF THIS
IMPORTANT DOCUMENT.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 5 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0343

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS FROM US REP MBFR

11. THEREFORE IT IS FULLY LOGICAL TO EXPECT THAT THE FUTURE
AGREEMENT WILL BE FORMULATED IN SUCH A WAY THAT IT WILL NOT
UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES GIVE ANY DIRECT PARTICIPANT THE
POSSIBILITY OF EVADING A REDUCTION OF ITS FORCES OR EVEN IN THE
FUTURE RE-ESTABLISHING OR EXCEEDING THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF
THE FORCES WHICH IT HAD BEFORE THE REDUCTION. THE NEW PROPOSALS
OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ENVISAGE SUCH A PROVISION. THESE
PROPOSALS ENVISAGE CONCRETELY THAT IN, THE CASE OF A POSSIBLE
UNILATERAL REDUCTION IN ITS FORCES BY ANY STATES, NO OTHER STATE
PARTICIPATING IN THE AGREEMENT AND BELONGING TO THE SAME
GROUPING MAY INCREASE ITS FORCES BY MORE THAN 50 PERCENT OF THE
NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES BEING REDUCED BY ITS ALLIES
AND, UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, MUST NOT AS A RESULT OF SUCH AN

INCREASE RE-ESTABLISH OR EVEN MORE IMPORTANTLY EXCEED THE NUMERICAL
STRENGTH OF THE FORCES WHICH IT HAD BEFORE THE REDUCTION. THIS
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PROPOSAL IS QUITE FLEXIBLE. ON THE ONE HAND IT TAKES INTO
ACCOUNT THE WISHES OF THE WEST AS REGARDS THE COLLECTIVE LEVEL
OF ARMED FORCES, AND ON THE OTHER IT ENVISAGES A SENSIBLE INDIVIDUAL
CONTRIBUTION BY EACH OF THE ELEVEN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE
REDUCTION OF THE HIGH CONCENTRATION OF ARMED FORCES IN THE
REGION OF REDUCTIONS IN CORRESPONDENCE WITH ITS MILITARY POWER
IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

12. MOREOVER, THE NEW PROPOSALS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES CONTAIN
A PROVISION THAT THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE FORCES OF EACH
STATE REMAINING AFTER THE REDUCTIONS, CANNOT BE INCREASED
THROUGH AN INCREASE IN THE QUANTITY OF MILITARY POSITIONS,
FILLED IN PEACE TIME BY CIVILIANS. LIKE THE ABOVE MENTIONED
PROVISIONS, THIS PROVISION ALSO IS DIRECTED AT PROVIDING FOR THE
CARRYING OUT OF A GENUINELY EQUIVALENT REDUCTION AND HAS AS A
GOAL TO ESTABLISH AN EFFECTIVE BARRIER TO POSSIBLE ATTEMPTS TO
INCREASE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF ARMED FORCES EITHER DIRECTLY,
OR IN AN INDIRECT FASHION.

MR CHAIRMAN

13. THE PATH FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE FIRST CONCRETE AGREEMENTS
CONCERNING THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THE
REGION OF CENTRAL EUROPE IS OPENED UP THROUGH THE INTRODUCTION
OF THE NEW, CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES.
WE COULD PROCEED WITHOUT DELAY TO THE WORKING OUT OF THE TEXT
OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT ON REDUCTION IN THE FIRST STAGE. IN
OUR OPINION THIS IS FULLY POSSIBLE BECAUSE WE NOW HAVE AT OUR
DISPOSAL FOR THIS A GOOD COMPROMISE BASIS, WHICH IS
ADVANTAGEOUS FOR BOTH SIDES AND STRICTLY IN CONFORMITY WITH THE
AGREED PRINCIPLES, MUTUALITY OF REDUCTION AND NON-DIMINISHING
OF THE SECURITY OF EITHER SIDE. WE WOULD SINCERELY HOPE THAT THE
WESTERN STATES WILL APPROACH THESE NEW PROPOSALS WITH THE
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NECESSARY ATTENTION AND, IN THE NEAREST FUTURE WILL GIVE THEM
A CONSTRUCTIVE, BUSINESSLIKE RESPONSE. END TEXTRESOR

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: NEGOTIATIONS, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS, MEETING REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 15 jun 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978MBFRV00343
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780250-1024
Format: TEL
From: MBFR VIENNA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780656/aaaabwgo.tel
Line Count: 489
Litigation Code IDs:
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Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 9
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 16 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2340547
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: JUNE 15 EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENT AT THE 173RD PLENARY MEETING OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WAS HELD ON JUNE 15 UNDER THE CHAI RMANSHIP O
TAGS: PARM, XH, XT, NATO
To: STATE DOD
Type: TE
vdkgvkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/2e966088-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
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Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014